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Abstract 
 
This paper has two purposes. One is to suggest that constitutional pluralism is an empty 
idea. Where there are multiple sources of apparently constitutional law one always 
takes precedence and the other is then no longer constitutional. Dialogue may help the 
legal sources reconcile, but it does not change the normative hierarchy between them. 
The second purpose is to make a concrete proposal for embedding pluralist thinking 
within EU law. The proposal is in the spirit of Maduro’s suggestion that national courts 
should take account of EU interests in interpreting national law, and also in the spirit of 
Kumm’s suggestion that EU law should be self-policing. However, unlike Maduro it 
focuses on the need for a more pluralist approach within EU law, rather than national 
law, and unlike Kumm it focuses on the need to prevent EU law becoming a threat to 
national constitutions, rather than mechanisms for defusing conflict if things get that far. 
The two purposes are linked by a common perception: that the investment in 
constitutional pluralism by scholars has not brought satisfactory returns, yet pluralism 
is too attractive an idea to be abandoned in haste. 
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Constitutional Disagreement in Europe and the search for 
Pluralism  
 
Gareth Davies 
 
Introduction 
This paper has two purposes. One is to suggest that constitutional pluralism is an empty 
idea. Where there are multiple sources of apparently constitutional law one always takes 
precedence and the other is then no longer constitutional. Dialogue may help the legal 
sources reconcile, but it does not change the normative hierarchy between them. The 
second purpose is to make a concrete proposal for embedding pluralist thinking within EU 
law. The proposal is in the spirit of Maduro’s suggestion that national courts should take 
account of EU interests in interpreting national law, and also in the spirit of Kumm’s 
suggestion that EU law should be self-policing.1 However, unlike Maduro it focuses on the 
need for a more pluralist approach within EU law, rather than national law, and unlike 
Kumm it focuses on the need to prevent EU law becoming a threat to national constitutions, 
rather than mechanisms for defusing conflict if things get that far. The two purposes are 
linked by a common perception: that the investment in constitutional pluralism by scholars 
has not brought satisfactory returns, yet pluralism is too attractive an idea to be abandoned 
in haste. 
                                                        
VU University Amsterdam  
This is a pre-publication draft of a chapter to be published in M Avbelj and J Komárek (eds) Constitutional 
Pluralism in Europe and Beyond, forthcoming in Hart.  
1 M Maduro ‘Contrapunctual [sic] Law: Europe’s Consitutional Pluralism in Action’ in N Walker (ed) 
Sovereignty in Transition (Oxford, Hart, 2003); M Kumm ‘The Jurisprudence of Constitutional Conflict: 
Constitutional Supremacy in Europe before and after the Constitutional Treaty’ (2005) 11 European Law 
Journal 262. 
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The paper begins by outlining why constitutional pluralism is attractive to scholars, and 
why it is unconvincing. It provides a summary of the argument about constitutional 
pluralism. The paper then moves on to develop this in more detail. It first describes the 
disagreement between some national supreme courts and the Court of Justice about the 
relative status of national constitutional and EU law. It then considers the likely practical 
consequences of these disagreements, concluding that the greatest risk is not of a clash of 
grand constitutional principles, but rather just that EU law may spread to the point that it is 
seen as no longer constitutionally legitimate. The major need therefore, in a Europe where 
the Treaties co-exist alongside national constitutions, is for a mechanism within EU law 
which prevents such law and policy spread. This would be a mechanism integrating 
pluralism within EU law. The suggestion is thus that pluralism of legal systems, or of 
constitutions, leads us nowhere, but pluralism within a legal system - a pluralist legal 
system - is an option worth exploring. 
Constitutional pluralism 
The initial attractiveness of constitutional pluralism is as a description of the apparently 
unstable, or unresolved, hierarchy between (certain) national constitutions and EU law.2 
Since neither bows to the other, and each is supreme on its own terms, a description of the 
overall state of affairs in terms of pluralism seems more convincing than one which 
concedes to the claims of one side or the other.3 Yet the symmetry of the situation is 
illusory. National courts control the outcome of actual cases, and in most cases they still 
consider that their ultimate allegiance, in the event of conflict, is to national constitutions 
                                                        
2 See generally N MacCormick ‘The Maastricht-Urteil: Sovereignty Now’ (1995) 1 European Law Journal 259; 
N Walker ‘The Idea of Constitutional Pluralism’ (2002) 65 Modern Law Review 317; N W Barber ‘Legal 
Pluralism and the European Union’ (2006) 12 European Law Journal 306; M Maduro ‘Interpreting European 
Law: Judicial Adjudication in a Context of Constitutional Pluralism’ (2007) European Journal of Legal Studies 
1; N Krisch ‘The Case for Pluralism in Postnational Law’ LSE Law, Society and Economy Working Paper 
12/2009. 
3 MacCormick, ibid; N MacCormick Questioning Sovereignty (Oxford, OUP, 1999). 
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and national supreme courts.4 EU law may assert, but it lacks the means to enforce its 
assertions.5 National constitutions are the superior authority in practice.  
Since one of the conventional attributes of a constitution is that it is the highest source of 
law within its jurisdiction, EU law is hardly constitutional in most states. Its constitutional 
status is limited to the Court of Justice itself and the courts of those states, if there are any, 
that accept unreservedly the absolute supremacy of EU law. In these states, national 
constitutions hardly deserve their name any more, and are now subordinate law. However, 
in the states that retain their own constitutions as the highest legal document, it is EU law 
that is ultimately subordinate. To speak then of constitutional pluralism, as if the Treaties 
and the constitutions of Member States were equal partners, is more deceptive than 
descriptive. It describes the rhetorical independence of the two legal orders, but ignores the 
fact that in actual situations – as sources of applicable law – there is in most states an 
unequivocal ultimate hierarchy. EU law is at best a constitution without a jurisdiction: it 
may be the final authority in its own sphere, but that sphere is largely virtual rather than 
actual. 
This is uncomfortable for those reared on the optimistic assertions of the Court of Justice 
about the nature of EU law, and those who value the EU and fear the resurgence of 
nationalism and protectionism. Yet to keep faith with the Court is also uncomfortable. One 
can assert that national courts are simply ‘wrong’ but this is to refuse any concessions to 
reality, and risk rendering EU law ridiculous, even pitiful, while also ignoring the 
democratic problems of placing the less accepted European order above the more accepted 
national one. Alternatively, one can explain that the Court of Justice is entirely correct, but is 
talking about the EU legal order, not the national, so that there is no doctrinal conflict.6 This 
                                                        
4 See for overviews of the position of the various Member State supreme courts; J Baquero Cruz ‘The Legacy of 
the Maastricht-Urteil and the Pluralist Movement’ (2008) 14 European Law Journal 389, 397-403; M Kumm 
‘The Jurisprudence of Constitutional Conflict: Constitutional Supremacy in Europe before and after the 
Constitutional Treaty’ (2005) 11 European Law Journal 262, 263-266; A Albi ‘Supremacy of EC Law in the 
New Member States’ (2007) 3 European Journal of Constitutional Law 25. There may be some exceptions. See 
B de Witte ‘Do Not Mention the Word: Sovereignty in Two Europhile Countries’ in N Walker (ed) Sovereignty 
in Transition (Oxford, Hart, 2003). 
5 D Chalmers ‘Judicial Preferences and the Community Legal Order’ (1997) 60 Modern Law Review 164. 
6 This is sometimes called ‘radical pluralism’. See N MacCormick Questioning Sovereignty (Oxford, OUP, 1999). 
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Jesuitical argument is coherent, but entirely unconvincing. It assumes that when the Court 
of Justice answers preliminary references it is not providing an instruction to national 
courts which it expects to be followed, but instead making abstract assertions about the 
nature of the EU legal order, without any concern about their effect or role in national 
courts. First, this is manifestly incorrect: the Court does not conceive of itself in such a 
philosophical role. Second, it would be irresponsible if it did. The Treaties are goal-oriented, 
not theory-oriented. The Court’s clear attributed function is not to wash its hands of the 
relationship between EU law and national law but to provide judgments which can and will 
be accepted by national courts, in order that EU law is effective in practice. 
Hence there is a great attractiveness in solutions which seem to offer a third way between 
blind allegiance to one order or another. Constitutional pluralism is presented as such a 
third way, and its apparent descriptive nature belies an invariable normative undertone. 
Constitutional pluralists think that neither national constitutions nor the EU Treaty should 
dominate the other, and both should exist side by side in a non-hierarchical way.7  
Yet normative pluralism is as unattractive as descriptive pluralism is inadequate. There is 
no finessing the choice between legal chaos and hierarchy.8 When a court is faced with a 
conflict between the Treaties and the national constitution it either chooses one 
consistently, in which case there is hierarchy, or it chooses arbitrarily, in which case there is 
chaos.9  
Perhaps the basic error of constitutional pluralism is to forget that law is only meaningful, 
and only interesting, when it is applied. A non-applicable law is merely a castle of 
propositions. Pluralism can be used to describe the relationship between EU law and 
national constitutions right up to the point at which these are applied to actual situations, 
whereupon it collapses and melts away. 
                                                        
7 See n 2 above; P Kirchhof ‘The Balance of Powers between National and European Institutions’ (1999) 5 
European Law Journal 225. 
8 J Baquero Cruz ‘The Legacy of the Maastricht-Urteil and the Pluralist Movement’ (2008) 14 European Law 
Journal 389. 
9 See R Dworkin Law’s Empire (Cambridge Mass., Harvard University Press, 1986) 179 et seq ;179; P 
Eleftheriadis ‘Pluralism and Integrity’ Oxford Legal Studies Research Paper 43/2009 8-14.. 
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Nevertheless, pluralism remains an attractive idea, with its implications of tolerance and 
accommodation. Hence, even if cannot be applied to the relationship between EU law and 
national law it is worth seeing if it can be applied within these systems. For example, as is 
expanded upon below, EU law could be made pluralist in that it could be constructed in a 
way that showed respect for and accommodation of the different national – and 
international - legal orders with which it must interact. It could display self-restraint. This 
paper makes a concrete proposal for how such pluralist self-restraint could be incorporated 
in EU law.  
Such internal EU pluralism would not affect the hierarchy between the national and the 
European. Internal EU doctrines cannot affect these inter-systemic issues, at least not in the 
short term. Perhaps in the long term they may have an indirect effect by rendering the 
‘surrender’ of national systems to EU supremacy more or less likely. However, internal 
pluralism can make the chances that actual conflict arises between the legal orders much 
less likely. By increasing the acceptance of EU law within national orders it could also help 
EU law integrate into national law, so that it better achieves its goals and becomes a more 
present part of national legal life. Integrating the possibility of concession to national law 
into EU law may, paradoxically, increase the status and effectiveness of that EU law.10 It is 
thus, on the goal-oriented terms of the Treaties, a good interpretation of the law. 
The disagreement between national supreme courts and the Court of Justice 
There is an apparent disagreement between several national supreme courts and the 
European Court of Justice about the status of EU law. The national courts, notably the 
Bundesverfassungsgericht, take the view that if EU law infringes aspects of the national 
constitution it will no longer apply on their territory, at least to the extent of the 
                                                        
10 D Ross Phelan Revolt or Revolution: The Constitutional Boundaries of the European Community (Dublin, 
Round Hall/Sweet and Maxwell, 1997); G Martinico ‘Preliminary Reference and Constitutional Courts: Are you 
in the Mood for Dialogue?’ University of Tilburg TICOM Working Paper 2009/10, on the attractions for 
national supreme courts of normative flexibility in EU law. 
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infringement. 11 The European Court of Justice, by contrast, claims that EU law is not subject 
to national constitutions.12 In the event of a conflict, EU law should nevertheless be applied.  
Each court is correct according to its own legal order. Each is the authoritative interpreter 
of its own document, in the first case the national constitution and in the second case the 
European Treaties. The national courts notably do not claim an interpretative jurisdiction 
over EU law. They do not claim that EU legislation or judgments which infringe the 
constitution are invalid or wrongful. They simply say that the national constitution 
prohibits the application of such acts. Since supreme courts are the authoritative 
interpreters of their constitutions, this view must be accepted as correct as a matter of 
constitutional law – whether or not it is wise or desirable. Similarly, if the ECJ, as the body 
that is unquestionably the authoritative interpreter of the Treaties, claims that EU law is 
unaffected by national constitutions, then this is also the case, as a matter of EU law.  
It may seem odd that both sides can be correct. However, this difference of perspective is 
not between two courts within a common legal order, who take different views on what 
that legal order entails. Rather, there is a clash of legal orders. Two sets of rules exist, and 
they say different things. Since each order determines its own interpretation, there is no 
doctrinal reason why the two orders, or their courts, cannot say contradictory things but on 
their own terms each be correct.   
This is nevertheless a disagreement, rather than just a difference, because both legal orders 
claim jurisdiction over the same circumstances. When the ECJ makes its claim of supremacy, 
it is not talking about EU law in the abstract or only insofar as it applies in the Court in 
Luxembourg. It is making the very concrete normative statement that, as a matter of EU 
law, national judges faced with a conflict between the constitution and EU law should prefer 
and apply the latter. This instruction – a particularly appropriate word since the claim was 
formulated in the context of the preliminary reference procedure – is directly contradictory 
                                                        
11 N 4 above.  
12 Case 11/70 Internationale Handelsgesellschaft mbH v Einfuhr- und Vorratsstelle für Getreide und Futtermittel  
[1970] ECR 1125. 
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to the instruction which national constitutional courts do, would and will provide if they are 
asked the same question by the same judge, as may well occur. 
In fact the ECJ is also making an implicit claim about national law. It is asking judges to 
transfer their allegiance from the constitution to the Treaties. However, it is clear that a 
judge cannot switch from subjection to legal order A to subjection to legal order B unless he 
takes the view that legal order A permits this. Legal order A may do so ‘voluntarily’, on its 
own terms, in a surrender to the new order, or it may be the case that in some sense legal 
order A has become weakened or diminished so that it is no longer ‘capable’ of binding a 
judge against legal order B. However, a slave cannot choose his master – he must be 
released. 
The ECJ must be understood as inviting and instructing national judges to find that national 
law in fact permits them to transfer ultimate allegiance to EU law, and prefer it over the 
constitution. This may be voluntary, or because national law has in fact been ‘conquered’ by 
EU law. But in any case, for the ECJ’s instruction to be more than posturing, it must be 
taking the view that national law is no longer capable of binding national judges against 
contrary EU law. 
If the ECJ does not take this view, then it is making statements which it knows to be 
irrelevant. It is answering a question about what a judge should do with something that it 
accepts that judge cannot do. This would not be a very constructive use of the reference 
procedure, and nor would it be a very purposive or useful approach to EU law. The Court is 
not paid to provide interpretations that are, as a matter of principle, unconnected to 
adjudicative reality. It is therefore quite implausible to think that the judgments on 
supremacy should be read as ‘you must obey EU law (although we are not saying anything 
about whether you can)’. Rather they are ‘you must and can obey EU law’.13 These are 
therefore attempts at legal colonialism, at absorbing the national legal order within the 
European, and at removing the national constitution from its supreme position in the 
national courtroom – at de-constitutionalising it. They are, however - alas for the ECJ - 
                                                        
13 See also the loyalty obligation, Article 4(3) TEU. 
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attempts that have failed. National courts do not, at least in many states, regard the 
constitution as having surrendered.14 Since the ECJ has chosen not to retreat from its 
position, a principled disagreement remains. 
This leaves us in a position well-known in international law. Sometimes states, like people, 
make promises that they had no right to make – according to their own law – and which 
they cannot keep – because of their own courts. This does not make the promises any less 
binding in the eyes of international law.15 Nor does it make the national laws any less valid. 
It just means there is a problem. At the moment that problem in the European context is 
largely theoretical. However, if EU law crosses the lines that national constitutional courts 
draw the problem will become very real. 
The chances of concrete conflict 
If EU law does not in fact conflict with national constitutions then disagreements over 
supremacy become considerably less urgent. Until now it has only conflicted with one or 
two, and then only in fairly marginal and easily resolved ways.16 However, there are a 
number of reasons to fear that this happy situation may be temporary. 
Firstly, EU law is spreading into ever more areas, including particularly sensitive ones such 
as criminal law, security, immigration and family law. The chance of a collision with basic 
national values becomes greater. Secondly, post-enlargement there are many more 
supreme courts in the Union, some of which have already shown themselves to be capable 
of assertiveness. Thirdly, in its recent Lisbon judgment the BvG reiterated a possible new 
basis for rejection of EU law; that it has limited the sovereignty of the state so much that the 
state can no longer define the socio-economic circumstances of its citizens.17 This national 
                                                        
14 N 4 above. 
15 See Article 27 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties; Eleftheriadis, n 9 above, 12. 
16 See J Komarek ‘European Constitutionalism and the European Arrest Warrant: Contrapunctual [sic] 
Principles in Disharmony’ Jean Monnet Working Paper 10/05; Baquero Cruz n 4 above. 
17 Judgment of the Bundesverfassungsgericht of 30 June 2009, BverfG 2 BvE 2/08 63 (NJW) 2009, 2267. An 
official translation is available on www.bundesverfassungsgericht.de. See C Wohlfhahrt ‘The Lisbon Case: A 
Critical Summary’ (2009) 10:8 German Law Journal 1277, 1284-1285; ‘Karlsruhe has Spoken. “Yes” to the 
Lisbon Treaty but…’, editorial in (2009) 46 Common Market Law Review 1023; D Thym ‘In the Name of 
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capacity and autonomy was seen by the Court as a part of the democracy which the 
constitution protects.  Thus for EU law to collide with the German constitution it is not 
necessary that it violate more conventional human rights, but sufficient that it just ‘go too 
far’ so that there is not enough national freedom left to define life in the German republic.  
This interesting idea takes a fairly conventional constitutional value – democracy – and 
turns it into an extremely broad tool for policing the spread of EU law. Even conventional 
socio-economic EU legislation may, just by virtue of its accumulated mass and effect, 
become a constitutional issue, perhaps without any particular rule being notably offensive 
or odd.  
This is in contrast to early perspectives on the supremacy debate which located it very 
much in the human rights corner, and emphasised the constitutional objection that the EU 
did not have an adequate system of rights protection.18 This was an easy one for the ECJ to 
address, and it did. However, the more general demand that EU law not limit state freedom 
too much will require a more subtle, and a broader, approach. This will be discussed further 
below. 
Cheerful pluralism 
The situation sketched above is sometimes described in terms of constitutional pluralism, 
and when these words are used it is very often in a broadly approving way. Such pluralism 
is seen as protecting diversity, and as preferable to the domination of one legal order by 
another. Since both enjoy a certain legitimacy, but represent different interests and 
perspectives, surely their courts should engage in an ongoing and respectful dialogue, 
seeking conciliation, but retaining the possibility of disagreement. In this latter possibility 
lies the autonomy of the legal order, and its legal self-respect, and its judges’ capacity to 
                                                                                                                                                                                   
Sovereign Statehood: A Critical Introduction to the Lisbon Judgment of the German Constitutional Court’ 
(2009) 46 Common Market Law Review 1795. 
18 The emphasis began to move from rights to competence around the time of the Maastricht Judgment of the 
BvG. See M Kumm ‘Who is the Final Arbiter of Constitutionality in Europe? Three Conceptions of the 
Relationship between the German Federal Constitutional Court and the European Court of Justice’ (1999) 36 
European Law Journal 351; L Besselink ‘Entrapped by the Maximum Standard: On Fundamental Rights, 
Pluralism and Subsidiarity in the European Union’ (1998) 35 Common Market Law Review 629. 
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fulfill their duty to those who have entrusted them with jurisdiction. Thus a pluralist 
perspective on the EU-national judicial relationship may welcome the consensual 
resolution of specific disagreements, but does not seek to resolve any of the ‘ultimate’ 
questions, or to remove the capacity for future differences. Maduro has recently taken this 
approach.19 
One of the virtues of his analysis is that it is realistic, in that it accepts that differences about 
the question of ultimate supremacy will not go away. This is certainly the case for at least 
the near future. The ECJ shows no sign of discovering that the EU Treaties are in fact subject 
to constitutional law, and supreme courts seem to be becoming only more assertive in their 
claims that constitutions determine what applies within the national jurisdiction. The 
disagreement can only be finally resolved by the surrender of one side, which does not 
seem imminent. 
However, the nonchalant charm of a pluralist world view can easily lead to a rather too 
sanguine assessment of the actual state of affairs. Tolerance of the other is a virtue, and 
thoughtful dialogue is a good thing, but they are not always sufficient to provide a fair and 
predictable legal regime.20 In particular, a defence of constitutional pluralism inevitably 
attempts to gloss the stark choice between a hierarchy of law, and a breakdown of law. It is 
suggested here that this attempt is hopeless, and the attachment of a pleasant-sounding 
pluralist label to the venture makes it no less so. For the reasons described earlier, 
constitutional pluralism turns out to be inadequate as either a description or a justification 
of the way things now are. 
The only situation which might be described as constitutionally pluralist is where national 
judges sometimes prefer EU law and sometimes the national constitution.21 Then both 
Treaties and constitutions would still have a claim to be constitutional, at least sometimes, 
while co-existing. However, a consideration of this possibility shows why pluralism is a 
                                                        
19 M Maduro ‘Interpreting European Law: Judicial Adjudication in a Context of Constitutional Pluralism’ 
(2007) European Journal of Legal Studies 1. 
20 J Baquero Cruz ‘The Legacy of the Maastricht-Urteil and the Pluralist Movement’ (2008) 14 European Law 
Journal 389. 
21 See n 9 above. 
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virtue mostly reserved for the political and social sphere. It is, in law, not a good thing. A 
legal system in which it is uncertain, or at the discretion of the judge, which rules apply is 
not compatible with most ideas of legal certainty. One might speak of a situation of 
constitutional arbitrariness. It is in fact the simple breakdown of law, and its replacement 
by judicial preference – the one judge being more pro-European than another. 
Respect and communication 
The policy risk which results from the European judicial standoff is that cold war becomes 
hot war: that EU law is set aside in national jurisdictions, on constitutional grounds, and 
that this becomes a trend which harms both the status of EU law and its application and 
effectiveness. Even if the concrete effect of constitutional judgments are not of great 
European importance – were the European Arrest Warrant not to take full effect in one land 
it would be regrettable, but not in itself a great impediment to European functioning or 
development, for example22 – the breaking of a taboo by actually setting EU rules aside may 
lead to a general loss of judicial respect for EU law. In many contexts the effectiveness of EU 
law is not just a question of application or not, but of the way that the rules are applied to 
particular facts, and the spirit in which they are interpreted. A diminution of respect may 
have hard-to-quantify but nevertheless important effects. 
This in turn may mean that EU policies do not achieve their goals, so that the capacity of the 
EU to influence economic and social development is limited, which in turn may heighten 
cynicism about the EU, and encourage policy-makers to look to other forums and means. 
Europe is the first point of call when cross-border problems arise only insofar as people 
believe that Europe is capable of effective action, and of harnessing the forces of application 
within Member States. 
How serious these risks are, and the likelihood of serious problems, is difficult to assess. It 
is really a matter which is best decided by empirical research into the attitudes and 
behaviour of judges, by psychologists and anthropologists. However, given that the political 
                                                        
22 See Komarek n 16 above. 
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foundations of and support for the EU are not rock-solid, and its law is often viewed with 
some suspicion, dislike or mystification by national judges, it seems plausible that the risks 
should at least be taken seriously. That is to say, the EU and the ECJ should at least consider 
what measures they could take to address them and minimise the chance that a destructive 
conflict or sequence of conflicts occurs.23 
In fact, both national and European courts have a legal obligation to minimise the chance of 
conflict. Even though national courts may express skepticism about EU law at the limits of 
its competence or legitimacy, they do not express doubt that most aspects of national 
participation in the EU are constitutionally legitimate. Thus the very same ideas of 
democracy and autonomy which threaten the EU in extreme circumstances may help it in 
everyday ones. The fact that the national democratic organs have chosen to participate in it 
is a reason to accept its rules wherever this is legally possible. Moreover, it is a fairly 
uncontroversial principle of good judging that as far as possible one seeks to reconcile the 
different rules relevant to a situation. On the whole, national courts should, and do, try to 
avoid stark choices. Nevertheless, such a soft approach has its limits, particularly where 
constitutions are the bearer of vested meanings and values. There are plenty of imaginable 
situations where a constitutional court might feel that conflict cannot be interpreted away. 
This leaves an important role for the ECJ. It is, moreover, in the position of supplicant. The 
national courts ask nothing of it, but it wants national courts to apply its law. Its law is also 
the law at risk. The ECJ is therefore the actor with the most obvious responsibility for 
reconciling the national and the European, by developing EU law in a way that avoids 
conflicts in the first place. It may also be noted that any interpretation of EU law which 
leads to its rejection by national courts is a bad interpretation, as a matter of EU law, since it 
manifestly does not achieve the goals of that law. It must moreover be open to doubt 
whether such an interpretation corresponds to the intention of the Treaty signers, insofar 
as that may matter. 
                                                        
23 N MacCormick ‘Risking Constitutional Collision in Europe’  (1998) 18 Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 517. 
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Maduro and Kumm have both suggested ways in which national and European courts can 
get along with each other. Maduro’s ideas are communicative and respect-based. He would 
like to see courts – his emphasis is on national courts, although not exclusively so                         
– paying more attention to the nature of their reasoning.24 When they take decisions they 
should take account of other legal orders, show them respect, and reason their judgments 
using arguments accessible to courts in other states. Instead of just focusing on the local 
context, they should explain in more general terms, European terms, why their decisions 
are justified, to show that they have taken account of the non-national interests involved, 
such as EU policies, or actors established in other states.  Maduro would like to see judicial 
reasoning become less parochial in its perspective and conceptual vocabulary. 
Kumm addresses what happens when conflicts occur.25 He suggests that there should be a 
principle of EU law which authorises national constitutional courts to set aside EU law on 
specific constitutional grounds, that is to say when there are specific types of conflict with 
important constitutional rules. This is in the spirit of Ross Phelan’s suggestion that EU law 
be set aside in circumstances where it would lead  to national legal revolt or revolution.26 
This chapter proposes a variation on Kumm’s argument. What is taken from him is the idea 
that EU law should try to police itself, and not leave this to national constitutions. While 
national courts will undoubtedly continue to regard their constitutions as a line which may 
not be crossed, they may well be prepared to consider whether conflicts can be avoided by 
first voicing their concerns within the framework of EU law, if that framework allows such 
concerns can be heard.  It is this giving of a voice to national constitutional concern to which 
EU law should now aspire. 
However, addressing national concerns purely by reference to the national constitution, as 
Kumm does, has disadvantages. Firstly, it cuts the ECJ out of the loop. Even if they were to 
be asked to contribute to the decision, via a reference, the framing of the issue purely in 
terms of national law would limit what they could contribute. Secondly, this approach 
                                                        
24 Maduro, n 1 above. 
25 Kumm, n 1 above. 
26 Ross Phelan, n 10 above. 
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encourages national legal insularity. It stimulates exactly what Maduro warns against: 
national courts which focus exclusively on their local doctrine and interests and fail to 
interpret their national law in a European context. Thirdly, it is implausible to expect 
constitutional courts to show any interest in this doctrine. It amounts to an EU law 
acknowledgment of what they had already asserted the independent right to do anyway. As 
such, it can be seen as an attempt to force constitutional courts to concede EU law 
supremacy even while they reject European rules, by claiming that their rejection is a part 
of EU law. The unshakeable importance which these courts attach to their constitutions 
would probably lead them to refuse this offer to come into the European legal order. They 
would, it is suggested, continue to locate any reasoning about the interaction of the 
constitution and the Treaties firmly within the constitutional context, as a matter of 
constitutional principle. 
But the most substantive objection is that by placing his conciliation process at the 
constitutional level Kumm offers a last line of national defence whereas it is a first line that 
is perhaps more urgently needed. It was suggested above that future constitutional conflicts 
may arise because ordinary EU law has spread so much that national autonomy and 
democracy are perceived to be threatened. The aim of the ECJ should be to prevent this 
point from being reached. EU law needs to be policed before it becomes a constitutional 
threat. It is precisely the escalation of everyday EU law to a national constitutional issue 
that the ECJ should try to avoid. 
Policing by proportionality and procedure 
In fact direct conflicts with traditional constitutional law are likely to be relatively trivial 
matters, and easy to resolve. In the event that an EU measure violates some fundamental 
right it can be dropped or amended without loss of face as a matter of EU law.27 Where EU 
law directly contradicts other aspects of the constitution, this is likely to be legal accident. 
For example, where the European Arrest Warrant was incompatible with several 
                                                        
27 Case 11/70 Internationale Handelsgesellschaft mbH v Einfuhr- und Vorratsstelle für Getreide und Futtermittel  
[1970] ECR 1125; Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union. 
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constitutions, this was simply because states had not completed their constitutional 
amendments on time.28 Although the cases are discussed in terms of grand principle, the 
problem was caused by procedural hiccups, relatively easily sorted out with little long term 
impact. In short, the principles and structures of classic constitutionalism are open enough, 
and unobjectionable enough, that complying with them is not a significant policy constraint 
for the EU and should not raise any structural problems. Conflicts will be incidents, not 
clashes of ideology. 
The more serious problem is what the BvG identified as the growing threat to national 
autonomy posed by EU law. It was concerned that the law may so limit the capacity of 
national governments to define the life circumstances of their citizens that national 
democracy could no longer be said to be effective.29 Given that national democracy remains, 
in the eyes of most constitutional courts, essential, and constitutionally protected, the 
policy-constraining effect of the growth of EU law becomes a potential constitutional issue. 
The most serious risk of constitutional conflict is therefore raised by everyday EU law – 
socio-economic, criminal, environmental – which constrains national policy freedom. The 
challenge of preventing open rejection of EU law is the challenge of ensuring that EU law as 
a whole does not invade autonomy to an extent that crosses the constitutional courts’ red 
lines.30 In other words, it is the interaction of ordinary EU law with ordinary national law 
and policy that needs policing, with the aim of avoiding the circumstances where national 
courts feel the need to invoke the constitutional protection of democracy.  
As examples of serious substantive policy constraints, one may consider free movement, 
competition law, state aid and the euro rules, all of which have far-reaching and often 
unexpected consequences. As examples of intervention in areas of national law apparently 
removed from EU policy one may consider the rulings in which rules on the naming of 
                                                        
28 See Komarek, n 16 above. 
29 N 17 above. 
30 See G Davies ‘Subsidiarity: the wrong idea, in the wrong place, at the wrong time’ (2006) 43 Common 
Market Law Review 63. 
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children,31 the language of court cases,32 and questions of procedural administrative law 
were found to conflict with free movement,33 or in which state aid law has set limits to 
regional autonomy.34 Less surprisingly, but more importantly, one may consider the impact 
on welfare states and social policy of economic regulation as a whole.35 
It is understandable that states may feel that their autonomy is increasingly circumscribed, 
to a point that they may find almost intolerable. Yet at the same time, a simple concession to 
these feelings of powerlessness would amount to the abandonment of important EU 
policies, to which those same states have agreed. What is needed is therefore a policing 
process which is effective, and demonstrably effective – showing that the law is policed is 
almost as important to calming national nerves as actually policing it. On the one hand, 
therefore, there must be a system ensuring that EU law does not cause unnecessary 
destructive effects on national policy, and on the other hand there must be a system 
ensuring that national concerns as well as European interests are voiced and articulated in 
the decision-making process, so that it is apparent why judicial decisions go the way they 
do. Following the two paths indicated by Maduro and Kumm, there must be better 
communication and respect between orders, and there must also be rules mediating 
conflicts of interest, rules which may be no less important for almost never being used. 
Proposal 
The inclusion of state interests and of the value of autonomy should begin at the legislative 
phase. However, legislation, and the Treaty, will often have unintended consequences, 
particularly within a specific national institutional context.36 There is therefore also a need 
                                                        
31 Case C-148/02 Garcia Avello [2003] ECR I-11613. 
32 Case C-274/96 Bickel and Franz [1998] ECR I-7637. 
33 Case C-224/97 Ciola v Land Vorarlberg [1999] ECR I-2517. 
34
 Case C-88/03 Portugal v Commission [2006] ECR I-7115; Joined Cases C-428/06 to C-434/06 Unión General 
de Trabajadores de La Rioja [2008] ECR I-6747; R. Greaves ‘Autonomous regions, taxation and EC state aids 
rules’ (2009) 34 European Law Review 779. 
35 See ‘The European Social Model: Coping with the Challenges of Diversity’ Fritz Scharpf (2002) 40 JCMS 645; 
G Davies ‘The Process and Side-effects of Harmonisation of European Welfare States’, Jean Monnet Working 
Paper 2/06. 
36 See J Trachtman ‘Regulatory Competition and Regulatory Jurisdiction’ (2000) 3 Journal of International 
Economic Law 331, on the inevitable imperfection of economic regulation. 
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for a principle of substantive law which addresses the situation where EU law has unusually 
destructive or chaotic effects, and balances the interests involved.  
Such a balancing belongs naturally within proportionality, and as such is already a part of 
EU law. Asking whether the application of that law is in fact disproportionate, because it has 
particularly dramatic or harmful consequences, is not doctrinally new. However, in the 
application of proportionality national autonomy and the national capacity to formulate 
and carry out policy is rarely seen as a value in itself.37 That is precisely what needs to 
change. It is suggested that the statement below should be applied by the Court: 
‘States often have to adapt their policies and institutions to comply with EU law. That is an 
unavoidable consequence of membership. However, if the application of EU rules makes 
achievement of important and legitimate national policy preferences effectively impossible, 
or unreasonably difficult, then, depending upon the degree of EU or other interest in full 
application of that rule, it may be disproportionate to apply the rule in the particular 
context in question. States must provide evidence that amending their systems or policies 
to achieve their goals in a way compatible with EU law would either be unreasonably 
difficult or disproportionately harmful to other interests.’ 
The application of this would take place in the context of the preliminary reference 
procedure. As ever, application of EU rules is for the national court, and ultimately it would 
be they who would decide on specific cases of setting aside of an EU rule. However, it would 
be appropriate to ask a question to the Court, and it could even be suggested that a national 
court must do so if it is considering setting aside on these grounds. The Court would then 
provide general guidance on the meaning of proportionality and the nature and strength of 
the EU interests to be taken into account in the balancing process. It should also provide 
guidance on the kind and level of evidence that may be expected from Member States. 
The ambiguous and slippery nature of the division of powers in the reference procedure 
means that both national and European courts have an important role. Neither is 
                                                        
37 See Davies n 30 above. 
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emasculated, and it is in the interest of each to formulate their concerns and the relevant 
interests at their level in the most clear and complete way. Should their collective 
deliberation lead to the conclusion that application of EU law would be disproportionate 
there should then be an automatic procedure for investigation of the situation, consultation 
with the Commission and so on. 
This proposal is presented in terms of proportionality, and the adoption of national 
autonomy as a value to be weighed within that principle. However, it can equally be seen as 
a generalised public policy exception, or as a subjection of the supremacy principle to the 
principle of proportionality; the Court should acknowledge that under certain 
circumstances to grant supremacy to an EU rule, over a far more important national one, 
may be disproportionate. It matters little which description is chosen. The key idea 
reflected in the proposal is that good policy and constructive European integration require 
the EU to take account of national interests in the formulation, interpretation and 
application of EU law, just as national courts and institutions are supposed to take account 
of EU interests when developing and using their domestic rules. The aim is to defuse 
conflict by making interests and balances explicit. Instead of national judges setting aside 
national law because they feel they have to, they would be setting aside national law 
because, having heard evidence, they are satisfied that the state has been unable to provide 
a pressing reason not to. Occasionally, they would be setting aside EU law, because the state 
has made a convincing argument for exceptional circumstances, whereupon the 
Commission and other parties would begin working upon an acceptable solution. 
It is of course a dangerous proposal. It concedes the possibility of letting substantive EU law 
fail, in some contexts, at some times. However, the interests involved at national level are 
real, and ignoring them is a politically untenable as well as an undemocratic option. At any 
event, they will be discussed and asserted by national courts. The EU interest is therefore in 
bringing that discussion as far as possible within the European legal order, to ensure that 
European as well as national interests have a voice in resolving conflicts.  
There are (at least) three more criticisms. One is that the proposal amounts to re-opening 
the Treaties. In accepting, and continually reaffirming, the substantive content of the 
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Treaties Member States must be taken to have accepted the enforcement of the rules they 
contain. To introduce derogatory principles other than those which the Treaties already 
contain would be no more or less than a step backwards in integration. 
The response to this criticism is that it under-estimates the importance of the openness of 
the Treaty texts. They are more convincing as commitments to a process than as precise 
policy statements, and it seems reasonable to suggest that as interpretation develops and 
extends the scope of EU law it should also, in parallel, develop and extend the doctrines of 
control and restraint. Indeed, this is precisely Cassis de Dijon: the price for bringing equally 
applicable rules within the law on free movement was the parallel extension of the 
possibility of derogation.38   
This suggests the second obvious criticism: that the proposal above is no more than is 
already accepted in the law on free movement, where proportionate derogations on 
grounds of legitimate national interests are part of the law.39 Indeed there is much 
similarity, but the proposal goes two steps further. First, it generalizes the idea of such 
derogations to all EU law, including secondary legislation. Second, it makes the balancing of 
EU and national interests more explicit. The national judge, in particular, is invited not just 
to consider the national interest at stake, but the extent of the European one. 
Ironically, the greatest threat to EU law may then be national judges who fail to consider 
national interests. By over-applying EU law they raise the risk of its extension beyond the 
legitimate. On the contrary, such open rules need policing, and it will be the involvement of 
national judges in this process which will prevent constitutional conflict from becoming 
real. 
The third criticism is that this proposal would be bad for legal certainty. Particularly if it is 
applied to secondary legislation it will render all EU legislation conditional. Given the value 
placed on reciprocity by Member States, if they see other states successfully evading rules 
on the basis of special national circumstances this could lead to a spiral of ‘special cases’. 
                                                        
38 Case 120/78 Cassis de Dijon [1979] ECR 649. 
39 Ibid; Case C-55/94 Gebhard v Consiglio dell’Ordine degli Avvocati e Procuratori de Milano [1995] ECR I-4165. 
ERIC STEIN WORKING PAPER NO. 1/2010_____________________________________________________________GARETH DAVIES 
 20 
This is, in fact, precisely the point. There are two kinds of legal uncertainty which may arise: 
uncertainty over whether the law will in fact be properly applied, and uncertainty about the 
content of the law. The aim here is replace the first danger by the second, to internalise the 
tension between national policies and EU law. If states are not to ignore threatening rules, a 
mechanism is necessary to allow the threat to be addressed within the law. Having created 
that mechanism, the need is then to make the resulting uncertainty about content 
acceptable. That is done by exposing the rationale behind it. There is a trade-off between 
certainty and ambition. Rules which are clear and accepted will inevitably be limited in 
their capacity to create change. The EU, however, aspires to change Europe. Yet at the same 
time, it does not want to destroy the individuality of national legal systems or institutions. 
To reconcile these goals it is necessary to admit both ex ante and ex post assessments of the 
working and effect of EU law. The challenge is then to get states to accept the risks of ex 
post assessment, and that challenge is met by making it as reasoned and transparent as 
possible, and involving national courts as much as possible, so that the possibility of setting 
aside EU law after a reasoned judicial process becomes an integral part of its legitimacy, 
and also of its own goal of reconciling unity and diversity.  
Conclusion 
Accepting limits is part of legal maturity. EU law should not just recognise the lines drawn 
by doctrines of human rights and attribution, but also those resulting from the legitimate 
desire of communities to define their own life circumstances. If that means EU policies must 
sometimes make concessions, so be it: EU law has goals, but so do Member States, and EU 
law has no monopoly of legitimacy.  
An inability to compromise is usually fatal to relationships. The practical importance of 
taking proportionality seriously can be summed up without resort to pluralism: it makes 
the EU reasonable, and as such makes it a polity with which national law can work towards 
the shared goals of a better European society. 
